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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAURIA TANNER (Swensen), 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR., 
Defendant and Appellee, 
APPELLATE CASE 
No. 940079-CA 
CIVIL CASE 
No. 924902803DA 
PRIORITY NO. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
from a decree of divorce pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended). 
This appeal was brought by Mauria Tanner (Swensen), 
Plaintiff, from a final judgment and Amended Decree of Divorce 
entered on or about February 22, 1994, in the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its 
discretion in its division of the marital property. 
II. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in its award of alimony. 
III. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its 
discretion by imputing income to Ms. Tanner. 
IV. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its 
discretion in recognizing income to Ms. Tanner from distributions 
received from her interest in a family corporation. 
V. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its 
discretion in limiting Ms. Tanner's award of alimony. 
VI. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its 
discretion in declining to award either party attorney fees. 
VII. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its 
discretion disallowing both parties' presentation of closing 
argument. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court should modify a decree of the district 
court only "if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Any relevant text of statutory provisions or rules pertinent 
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to the resolution of the divorce issues presented for review is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce which was tried before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Court Judge, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on December 16, 1993. 
Amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of 
divorce were entered on February 22, 1994. The submitted amended 
findings of fact were drafted by counsel for Appellee, Mr. 
Swensen. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant Mauria Tanner ("Ms. Tanner") and Appellee 
James G. Swensen, Jr. ("Mr. Swensen") were married on November 
22, 1974 (Record (hereinafter "R.") at 23). 
2. The parties have four children, Alison who was 18 at the 
time of the divorce, Nathan who was 17, Clare who was 13 and 
Tanner who was 9. (R. 24). 
3. Ms. Tanner has a bachelor's degree in art which she 
received from BYU in 1989. (R. 22). Ms. Tanner also received a 
secretarial degree from BYU in 1976. Id. 
4. Mr. Swensen is a tax attorney and Certified Public 
Accountant. He also has a Masters Degree in Accountancy. (R. 
3 
23-24) . 
5. Ms. Tanner was employed full time while Mr. Swensen was 
in law school from 1979 to 1982. (R. 59). 
6. Beginning in 1979, Ms. Tanner was employed as a graduate 
assistant and secretary at a rate of $6.00 per hour. (R. 23-24). 
7. During law school Mr. Swensen worked as a graduate 
instructor earning between $1,500 and $2,000 each semester. (R. 
142) . 
8. Mr. Swensen also received assistance from his parents 
during law school. (R. 25, 142). 
9. Mr. Swensen's parents assisted in the purchase of the 
Crest View residence. Mr. Swensen's parents made payments on the 
house while Mr. Swensen was in law school. (R. 142). 
10. The parties' purchased the Crest View residence and 
also paid law school expenses with proceeds received from the 
sale of a vehicle which was Mr. Swensen's pre-marital property. 
(R. 186). 
11. Regarding the expert testimony on the value of Mr. 
Swensen's law practice, the trial court found the testimony of 
Mr. Swensen's expert, Mr. Shields, more credible. (Transcript of 
Judge's Ruling (hereinafter "Tr.") at 2-3). 
12. Mr. Shields performed several evaluations of sole law 
practitioners in the past. (R. 116). 
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13. Mr. Shields made an on-site inspection at Mr. Swensen's 
law office of the equipment, furniture, and fixtures. (R. 117). 
14. Mr. Shields considered an on-site inspection of the 
property essential for an accurate valuation of the present 
condition of the equipment, furniture, and fixtures. (R. 120). 
15. Ms. Tanner's expert failed to inspect the property, had 
no personal experience in valuing a law firm, and prepared 
several different valuations, some of which used improper 
calculations. (R. 8-10). 
16. Ms. Tanner's expert also failed to discount aged 
account receivables, although it was his general practice to do 
so. (R. 10). 
17. Mr. Swensen inspected the marital property located at 
the Lincoln Lane residence several days before trial and compiled 
a partial listing and valuation of the property. (R. 110). 
18. Mr. Swensen valued the parties' automobiles by current 
Blue Book value. Id. 
19. Mr. Swensen valued the Lincoln Lane residence pursuant 
to a recent appraisal of the house and real property admitted as 
evidence. (R. 112). 
20. Mr. Swensen's proposed property distribution valued the 
marital property in Ms. Tanner's possession at the time of trial 
with a net value of $5,000 over the marital property in his 
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possession. (R. 110, 155-56). 
21. Ms. Tanner owns an eight percent (8%) interest in a 
family corporation, Tanner, Inc., which value was not included in 
the marital estate. Only its income was considered by the trial 
court. (R. 86). 
22. Tanner, Inc. has a large number of valuable assets 
including: 3,500 acres in the high New Mexico desert, 150 head 
of beef cattle, $125,000 in vehicles and equipment, a $305,000 
contract balance, a $4,700 checking account, and a $24,700 money 
market account. (R. 84-86). 
23. The approximate value of Ms. Tanner's eight percent 
(8%) interest in Tanner, Inc. assets is at least $36,758, plus an 
eight percent (8%) ownership interest in 3,500 acres in the high 
New Mexico desert and 150 head of beef cattle. (R. 84-86). 
24. In combination with the other assets, Ms. Tanner owns 
an eight percent (8%) interest in the $305,000 contract balance 
from Tanner, Inc.'s sale of a trading post that is payable over 
ten years with interest. (R. 85). 
25. In 1992 and in 1993, Ms. Tanner received income 
distributions from Tanner, Inc. in the amount of $8,000 per year. 
(R. 48-49). 
26. Ms. Tanner's comment that she was informed by her 
father she will not be receiving any more large disbursements 
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from the Tanner, Inc. was objected to and sustained as hearsay. 
(R. 51, 98). 
27. Thus, the record is devoid of facts that Ms. Tanner 
will not receive such payments from the Tanner, Inc. in the 
future. (R. 83, 84 & 86). 
28. The trial court awarded Ms. Tanner approximately one-
half the parties' marital property ($92,000) and awarded Mr. 
Swensen a similar amount. (Tr. 5). 
29. Ms. Tanner received the Lincoln Lane residence and its 
total equity. Her own appraiser found that the house was not in 
need of repair. (R. 80). 
30. Mr. Swensen is presently renting an unfurnished house. 
(R. 142). 
31. Mr. Swensen has paid attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,000 - $4,000 from his one-half share of the marital estate. 
(R. 163). 
32. Mr. Swensen's attorney fees were charged against his 
portion of the marital property, were not charged against Ms. 
Tanner's portion of marital property, and the payment of attorney 
fees by Mr. Swensen did not reduce the total marital property to 
be distributed between the parties since he added the amount paid 
back into his proposed distribution. (R. 185-186.) 
33. Prior to representation by Ms. McConkie, Ms. Tanner 
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paid her former attorneys' fees in the amount of $5,000 from 
marital property. (R. 67). 
34. The parties' only marital debts at the time of 
separation of the parties were a student loan and a mortgage on 
the Lincoln Lane residence. (R. 139). 
35. Ms. Tanner testified that she should bear one-half of 
the liability of marital debts and obligations. (R. 62). 
36. During the parties marriage, a student loan was 
incurred to finance law school and pay for living expenses. (R* 
141) . 
37. Mr. Swensen used marital funds to pay off the marital 
debt of a student loan to Student Loan Servicing Corporation in 
the approximate amount of $10,996. (R. 168). 
38. Ms. Tanner testified to monthly expenses in the amount 
of $2,885.00. Id. 
39. Ms. Tanner pays her credit card balances and bills 
monthly and has no debt. (R. 60). 
40. Ms. Tanner recently purchased a computer for $1,500. 
(R. 63). 
41. Ms. Tanner expended funds in the amount of $2,800 for 
herself and her daughter to enroll in a voluntary self-esteem 
training course. (R. 88-89). 
42. Ms. Tanner has also paid charitable contributions in 
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the amount of $1,600. (R. 99). 
43. Ms. Tanner is presently attending school for 
retraining. (R. 93). 
44. Ms. Tanner is voluntarily underemployed and voluntarily 
enrolled at the University of Utah in a graduate program which 
she will complete within one to two years from the time of trial 
gaining a Master's Degree in Expressive Therapy. (R. 23-24, 60). 
45. If Ms. Tanner elects not to write a thesis in 
conjunction with her Master's degree, she may finish the program 
within one year from the time of trial. (R. 95). 
46. Ms. Tanner testified at trial that upon graduation she 
expects to be paid a starting salary of $20,000 per year. (R. 
94) . 
47. Whether there is any particular intention on the part 
of Ms. Tanner to pursue a Ph.D. following graduation from her 
Master's program is clearly speculation. (R. 99 - 100). 
48. Ms. Tanner has a history of working during the summer 
teaching art and is capable of earning $1,500 yearly doing so. 
(Tr. 3). 
49. Ms. Tanner has voluntarily elected not to teach the 
summer art classes which she has taught in the past. (R. 87). 
50. Additionally, Ms. Tanner has received a $2,500 non-
taxable student stipend. Id. The stipend Ms. Tanner received 
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was in the amount of $500 per month from August through December, 
1993. (R. 132). 
51. The trial court imputed income to Ms. Tanner in the 
amount of $1,000 per month based upon her income from teaching 
art, her student stipend, and her distributions from Tanner, Inc. 
(Tr. 3-4). 
52. Ms. Tanner testified that she received a distribution 
of income from Tanner, Inc., not a distribution of assets. (R. 
90) . 
53. Ms. Tanner also testified that Mr. Swensen, a Certified 
Public Accountant, prepared the parties' tax returns during the 
marriage. (R. 86). 
54. Each year Ms. Tanner received a Form K-l from Tanner, 
Inc. allocating taxes for her to pay in proportion to her eight 
percent (8%) ownership interest. (R. 104-105). 
55. The Form K-l allocates items of income, gain and loss 
deduction to individual shareholders of Tanner, Inc. in 
proportion to their stock ownership. (R. 105). 
56. Form K-l reports taxable income that the shareholders 
would include in their individual income tax returns. Id. 
57. The Form K-ls submitted into evidence show that Ms. 
Tanner received distributions with respect to income, rather than 
distributions of assets from Tanner, Inc., in the amounts of 
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$2,000 for 1989, $2,000 for 1990, $4,000 for 1991, $8,000 for 
1992, and $8,000 for 1993. (R. 131). 
58. The trial court found that Ms. Tanner's eight percent 
(8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. was pre-
inheritance/premarital property. (Tr. 5-6). 
59. The trial court awarded Ms. Tanner $700 alimony per 
month for a period of two years. (Tr. 5). 
60. Mr. Swensen has a gross monthly income of $5,625.00, 
disposable earnings of $3,671.00 and monthly expenses in the 
amount of 2,108.00. (Tr. 3-4). 
61. The trial court concluded that Mr. Swensen cannot pay 
any more than $700 per month in alimony. (Tr. 4). 
62. Mr. Swensen is paying $1,286 for his child support 
obligation. (Tr. 4). 
63. In addition to child support and alimony, Mr. Swensen 
is presently paying tuition for the parties' oldest daughter in 
the amount of $3,200 per year. (R. 147). 
64. Ms. Tanner retained three different attorneys to 
represent her in this matter. (R. 35). 
65. Ms. Tanner testified that the first two attorneys who 
represented her were unqualified to handle her divorce. (R. 35-
36) . 
66. Prior to representation by Ms. McConkie, Ms. Tanner 
11 
paid her former attorneys fees in the amount of $5,000 from 
marital funds. (R. 35). 
67. The trial court found that neither party demonstrated 
the ability to pay the other spouse's attorney's fees. (Tr. 6). 
68. Ms. Tanner did not testify regarding her need for 
attorney's fees or her inability to pay her attorney's fees in 
her direct examination or otherwise. Therefore, no evidence was 
presented respecting her need. (R. 192). 
69. The trial court specifically found that Ms. Tanner had 
sufficient assets from Tanner, Inc. and otherwise with which to 
pay her attorney fees. (Tr. 6). 
70. The trial court further found that there was no 
evidentiary basis from which to make an award for attorney's 
fees. (Tr. 6). 
71. The trial court disallowed both parties from presenting 
closing argument. (R. 192). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 
division of the marital property. The trial court has broad 
discretion in valuing and distributing marital property. Based 
upon the evidence presented, the trial court's award reflects an 
equitable division of the parties' marital estate, each party 
receiving one-half of the value of the marital property. 
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II. The trial court properly considered and applied the 
Jones factors in awarding alimony. Sufficient evidence exists to 
support the trial court's findings and application of all of the 
Jones factors including: (1) Ms. Tanner's financial condition 
and needs in light of the lifestyle she has enjoyed; (2) Ms. 
Tanner's ability to support herself; and (3) Mr. Swensen's 
ability to pay alimony. 
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
imputing income to Ms. Tanner. Ms. Tanner's imputed income from 
teaching art classes and from Tanner, Inc. was soundly based upon 
her historical earnings, her education, her marketable skills, 
etc., as set forth in her testimony. 
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
assessing Ms. Tanner income received from her ownership interest 
in Tanner, Inc. The trial court properly awarded Ms. Tanner her 
eight percent (8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. free and 
clear of any claim by Mr. Swensen and did not consider its value 
in awarding and dividing the marital property. However, the 
facts of Ms. Tanner's historical income from Tanner, Inc. clearly 
provided an evidentiary basis for recognizing her distributions 
as actual income received. 
V. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting 
the award of alimony to two years. The trial court carefully 
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weighed the Jones factors in its decision to limit Ms. Tanner's 
award of alimony to two years, using the evidence regarding her 
need, her ability to provide for her needs, and Mr. Swensen's 
ability to pay. 
VI. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 
failure to award either party attorney's fees. The trial court 
made a specific finding that there was no evidentiary basis from 
which to award attorney's fees and that Ms. Tanner had sufficient 
assets with which to pay her own fees, and ruled accordingly. 
Also, Ms. Tanner paid approximately $5,000 of her attorneys fees 
from marital property. Ms. Tanner received one-half of the 
marital estate, plus approximately $36,758 in value from Tanner, 
Inc. together with an eight percent (8%) interest in the unknown 
value of 3,500 acres of real property, 150 head of beef cattle, 
and all income derived therefrom. 
VII. There was no abuse of discretion in disallowing both 
parties' presentation of closing argument. The trial judge has 
discretion in allowing closing argument. Additionally, because 
neither party was allowed to present closing argument, Ms. Tanner 
could not have been unduly prejudiced. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DIVISION 
OF THE MARTIAL PROPERTY. 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in creating 
equitable orders that divide marital property. Potter v. Potter, 
845 P.2d 272 (Utah App, 1993); Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193, 
198 (Utah App. 1992); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 
App. 1990). This Court stated: "[w]e afford the trial court 
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property 
interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity." Watson. 837 P.2d at 5 (quoting Naranio v. Naranjo, 
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988)). The overriding 
consideration in a divorce action "is that the ultimate division 
be equitable," not necessarily exactly equal. Id. at 6. In 
order for Ms. Tanner to prevail on the issue of an inequitable 
marital property division, she must show that the trial court 
committed a "clear abuse of discretion." Id. This Court has 
held that with regard to property division "on appeal from a 
judgment of the trial court, our role is not to substitute our 
own findings for those of the trial court, but to examine the 
record for evidence supporting the judgment." Baker v. Baker 226 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Shioii v. Shioii. 
712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985)). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has held that it is "inappropriate 
for this court to reverse on an isolated item of property or debt 
distribution. Further, this court must examine the entire 
distribution to determine if the trial court abused its 
discretion." Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1148 (quoting Boyle v. Boyle, 
735 P.2d 669, 670-71 (Utah App. 1987)). Therefore, a trial 
court's determination on any one issue of property or debt 
distribution is not necessarily grounds for reversal. 
Ms. Tanner attacks the property division on the basis that 
the trial court accepted the values stated on Defendant's 
exhibits. However, "[w]hen considering testimony regarding 
valuation of property, the trial court 'is entitled to give 
conflicting opinions whatever weight [it] deems appropriate.'" 
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting 
Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah App. 1989). Based upon 
the evidence, the trial court specifically found Mr. Swensen's 
values of the marital property to be more credible and accepted 
those values. 
The trial court found the expert testimony of Mr. Shields, 
Mr. Swensen's expert, regarding the value of Mr. Swensen's law 
practice more credible because Mr. Shields had experience in 
valuing sole law practitioners' business. (R. 116). Mr. Shields 
made an on-site visit to Mr. Swensen's firm to value equipment, 
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furniture, and fixtures. (R. 117). Mr. Shields considered such 
an on-site inspection of the property essential in an accurate 
valuation since one should consider the condition of the firm's 
equipment, furniture, and fixtures. (R. 120). In contrast to 
Mr. Shield's testimony, Ms. Tanner's expert failed to discount 
aged account receivables, although it was his general practice to 
do so. (R. 10). Moreover, Ms. Tanner's expert failed to 
physically inspect the property, had no personal experience in 
valuing a law firm, and prepared several other general 
valuations, some of which used improper basis for his different 
conclusions. (R. 8-10). 
Respecting the distribution of the personal marital 
property, Mr. Swensen inspected the personal marital property at 
the Lincoln Lane residence several days before trial. (R. 110). 
He also valued the parties automobiles pursuant to their Blue 
Book values. Id. The value of the Lincoln Lane residence was 
based upon a recent real estate appraisal placed in evidence. 
(R. 112). Additionally, Mr. Swensen's proposed distribution did 
not value any assets which Ms. Tanner might have obtained through 
inheritance or gifts. (R. 187). 
Ms. Tanner argues that the trial court accepted the values 
stated on Mr. Swensen's proposed property distribution even 
though Mr. Swensen claimed a zero value in personal property for 
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himself. Ms. Tanner ignores the fact that Mr. Swensen's 
testimony as to the proposed property distribution was the 
personal marital property in Ms. Tanner's possession had a net 
value of $5,000 over the personal property to be awarded to Mr. 
Swensen. (R. 110). The trial court's valuation of the property 
is soundly based upon the evidence and should not be disturbed. 
Ms. Tanner contends that the trial court did not take into 
consideration her "special circumstances" in dividing the real 
property. However, there is nothing in the record indicating 
that Ms. Tanner was the victim of special circumstances or 
required any special consideration. 
Ms. Tanner argues that she does not have any income from the 
properties she received to support herself. There was no 
evidence that the marital property included any income producing 
property, nor did she request the same. The division of property 
need not provide Ms. Tanner with income producing property. Ms. 
Tanner has failed to provide any authority to support her 
argument that she must be awarded income producing assets. 
Even so, Ms. Tanner has received income producing assets. 
Ms. Tanner has an eight percent (8%) interest in Tanner, Inc. 
from which she derives income. (Tr. 5). Ms. Tanner's ownership 
of Tanner, Inc. was awarded to Ms. Tanner as separate property 
and not as a distribution of marital property. Ms. Tanner 
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personally receives income from the sale of assets by Tanner, 
Inc. (R. 82-83). Ms. Tanner has an eight percent (8%) interest 
in the $305,000 balance owing on the contract balance payable 
over a ten year period. Id. Further, Ms. Tanner was awarded 
one-half, or $92,000, of the parties' marital property in assets 
from which she may generate income. Id. The property awarded to 
Mr. Swensen generates no income except for the work product from 
his professional practice. Including the Tanner, Inc. assets 
awarded to Ms. Tanner, after the divorce Mr. Swensen has a lesser 
net worth than Ms. Tanner. 
Ms. Tanner contends that during the marriage she had no 
control or access to marital funds, apparently implying some 
inappropriateness on the part of Mr. Swensen. However, control 
of the marital assets is irrelevant in the award of the marital 
assets. This is particularly true in the present circumstances, 
since there is no evidence exists that the marital property was 
depleted because of Mr. Swensen's control. 
Specifically, Ms. Tanner complains that Mr. Swensen used 
marital funds for the payment of his attorney's fees in the 
amount of $3,000 - $4,000. (R. 163). However, Mr. Swensen's 
attorney's fees were charged against his portion of the marital 
property and were not charged against Ms. Tanner's portion of 
marital property. The payment of attorney fees by Mr. Swensen 
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did not reduce the total marital property to be distributed 
between the parties since the amount paid was added into his 
share of the proposed distribution of property. (R. 185-186). 
Thus, Ms. Tanner's marital property distribution was not reduced 
by what Mr. Swensen paid in attorney's fees. 
Ms. Tanner fails to note that prior to legal representation 
by Ms. McConkie, Ms. Tanner had access to marital funds and used 
those marital resources to pay legal fees to her former attorneys 
in the sum of at least $5,000. (R. 67). Additionally, Ms. 
Tanner had a garage sale at the Lincoln Lane residence where 
marital assets were sold in order to pay for a self-esteem 
training course for Ms. Tanner. (R. 89). Accordingly, Ms. Tanner 
reduced the total marital estate to be divided. 
Ms. Tanner also complains that Mr. Swensen paid off a 
student loan with marital funds. The student loan was a marital 
debt and legal obligation. Ms. Tanner testified at trial that 
she should bear one-half of the liability of marital debts and 
obligations. (R. 62). Therefore, it was appropriate to pay the 
student loan with marital property. 
Ms. Tanner argues that Finlayson v. Finlayson controls. 874 
P.2d 843, 849 (Utah App. 1994). However, the present case is 
distinguishable from Finlayson, where the Utah Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court abused its discretion in crediting the 
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husband's payments to his mother as a discharge of marital debt. 
In the Finlayson case there was dispute regarding whether the 
loan from the husband's mother was actually an enforceable debt 
or a gift. In the present case, there is no such controversy. 
The student loan discharged by Mr. Swensen was a legally 
enforceable contractual obligation to an independent third party, 
Student Loan Servicing Corporation, incurred during the marriage 
for the benefit of both parties. 
The Court should note that the Appellant's Addendum C and D 
to her brief contains financial declarations which were prepared 
by the parties and filed with the trial court several months 
before trial. The financial declarations were not evidence 
introduced at trial. While untested financial declarations are 
an acceptable basis for temporary awards, trial evidence is the 
basis for making final awards. 
The trial court's division and award of the marital property 
was well within the bounds of its discretion. Ms. Tanner 
received all of the equity in the Lincoln Lane residence. 
Pursuant to Ms. Tanner's own appraiser of the Lincoln Lane 
residence, there are no repairs needed on the house. (R. 80). 
In contrast, Mr. Swensen is presently renting an unfurnished 
house. (R. 142). Not only did Ms. Tanner received one-half of 
the parties' marital estate, she also received her eight percent 
21 
(8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. free and clear of any 
claim by Mr. Swensen with significant value. Ms. Tanner actually 
received more than Mr. Swensen in tangible assets. Ms. Tanner 
has not met the burden of showing that "there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Watson, 837 P.2d at 5. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND APPLIED THE JONES 
FACTORS IN AWARDING ALIMONY. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. In 
reviewing the trial court's award of alimony, the appellate court 
will not disturb the trial court's award absent a showing of 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Chambers v. Chambers. 
840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 
96, 100 (Utah 1986)). Utah law requires that the trial court 
consider three factors in determining a reasonable award of 
alimony: (1) the financial condition and needs of the requesting 
spouse; (2) the ability of the requesting spouse to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333 
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(citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988)); 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); and Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). These three factors are 
herein referred to as the "Jones factors" as identified in 
Appellant's brief. 
If the trial court considered the Jones factors, the 
appellate court will not disturb the trial court's alimony award 
unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. Morgan, 854 P.2d at 567 (quoting 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989)); accord 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-412 (Utah 1977); Rappleye 
v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993). 
First, the trial court considered Ms. Tanner's present 
financial condition and needs. The trial court found that Ms. 
Tanner had monthly expenses in the amount of $2,885 per month and 
imputable income of $1,000 per month. (Tr. 4). The trial court 
held that Ms. Tanner had a present need for alimony and awarded 
her $700 per month for two years. (Tr. 4-5). Based upon Ms. 
Tanner's testimony regarding graduation with her Master's degree, 
the trial court found that Ms. Tanner required assistance for a 
two year period of time. Ms. Tanner testified that upon 
graduation she will earn $20,000 per year. (R. 94). 
Ms. Tanner also testified that she pays off her credit cards 
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monthly and has no debt. (R. 60). Further, there is evidence 
that Ms. Tanner has disposable income. Ms. Tanner purchased a 
computer for $1,500 (R. 63), voluntarily enrolled and paid for 
self-esteem training in the amount of $2,800 (R. 88-89) for 
herself and her daughter, and gave charitable contributions in 
the amount of $1,600. (R. 99). 
Second, the trial court made findings regarding Ms. Tanner's 
ability to produce a sufficient income for herself. The trial 
court found that Ms. Tanner had actual income and imputable 
income in the amount of $1,000 per month. The trial court 
computed Ms. Tanner's income by calculating (1) the $8,000 she 
received from distribution of the family corporation, (2) the 
$1,500 she is capable of earning teaching art classes in the 
summer, and (3) the $2,500 she received as a student stipend. 
The trial court divided the 12,000 attributable as yearly income 
to Ms. Tanner to conclude that she had an income of $1,000 per 
month. (Tr. 3). 
Evidence in the records exists to establish that the trial 
judge considered Ms. Tanner's financial condition and ability to 
support herself. The record shows that Ms. Tanner received 
various distributions from Tanner, Inc. over the marriage 
including distributions of $8,000 per year for each of the last 
two years, one distribution in the amount of $4,000, and two 
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others in the amount of $2,000 each. (R. 49, 74-75). Ms. Tanner 
owns an eight percent (8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. 
valued at approximately $36,758 plus an eight percent (8%) 
interest in the unknown value of 3,500 acres of real property and 
150 head of beef cattle. (R. 84-86). The record shows that Ms. 
Tanner owns eight percent (8%) interest on the $305,000 contract 
balance from Tanner, Inc.'s sale of a trading post payable over 
ten years, id. The record is devoid of evidence that Ms. Tanner 
will not receive such distributions in the future. 
Ms. Tanner is voluntarily enrolled in school and is 
voluntarily underemployed. (R. 60). She voluntarily elected not 
to teach the summer art classes that she taught in the past from 
which she received $1,500 annual income. (R. 87). 
The trial court also examined Ms. Tanner's educational 
status and career goals. Ms. Tanner has a secretarial degree 
from BYU. (R. 22). She worked full time from 1979 through 1982, 
when Mr. Swensen finished law school. (R. 59). Ms. Tanner 
received her bachelor's degree from BYU as recently as 1989. (R. 
22). Ms. Tanner testified that she is going to school to be 
retrained. (R. 93). The trial court found that Ms. Tanner is 
presently enrolled at the University of Utah in a graduate 
program which she will complete within two years with a Masters 
Degree in Expressive Therapy. (R. 23-24). Further, the trial 
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court found that upon graduation Ms. Tanner expects to earn 
$20,000 per year. (R. 94). The trial court carefully evaluated 
Ms. Tanner's financial condition and ability to support herself 
in awarding rehabilitative alimony, holding that in two years 
she, by her own testimony, will have income of at least $20,000 
and in two years her need for alimony will cease since she will 
then be able to provide for herself. 
Third, in the Jones factors, the trial court made a specific 
finding as to Mr. Swensen's ability to provide support. In 
weighing Mr. Swensen's disposable earnings of $3,671 per month 
against his monthly expenses of $2,108, and $1,286 child support 
obligation, the trial court concluded that Mr. Swensen had an 
ability to pay alimony in an amount of no more than $700 per 
month. (Tr. 4). Thus, Mr. Swensen's monthly expenses and court-
ordered monthly obligations amount to $4,094.00. 
Ms. Tanner argues that she will not be able to maintain the 
same standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. Based 
upon the evidence and the trial court's finding, any inadequacy 
in the amount of the alimony award is limited by the family's 
limited resources and Mr. Swensen's inability to pay any more for 
monthly support. Therefore, neither party will be able to 
maintain the pre-divorce lifestyle. 
The basic undisputed evidence in the record explains the 
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basis for the trial court's award of alimony. Where evidence 
exists to support the trial court's decision regarding each of 
these three factors, the appellate court will not reweigh the 
evidence. Watson, 837 P.2d at 5. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY IMPUTING 
INCOME TO MS. TANNER BASED ON HER HISTORICAL INCOME. 
Ms. Tanner claims that the trial court erred by imputing 
income to Ms. Tanner in the amount of $1,500 for teaching summer 
art classes, and in the amount of $8,000 from Tanner, Inc. 
However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in basing 
its alimony award on Ms. Tanner's historical income. Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-45-7.5(7) authorizes the court to impute 
income in determining support obligations: "(b) If income is 
imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.5(7)(b) (1953, as amended). The trial court imputed income to 
Ms. Tanner after careful consideration of Ms. Tanner's employment 
history and educational qualifications. 
The record and testimony reflect that in 1979 Ms. Tanner was 
employed at a rate of $6.00 per hour as a graduate assistant and 
secretary. (R. 23-24). Since that time, Ms. Tanner has acquired 
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a bachelor's degree and enrolled in a graduate program. 
Moreover, the judge made a specific finding as to Ms. Tanner's 
"work history" of receiving $1,500 for teaching summer art 
classes. (Tr. 3). Ms. Tanner is voluntarily enrolled in a 
graduate program at the University of Utah and is voluntarily 
underemployed. (R. 60). There is no evidence in the record that 
Ms. Tanner cannot teach summer art classes while she is enrolled 
as a student in her graduate program. 
The trial court also found that Ms. Tanner had imputable 
income of $8,000 per year from Tanner, Inc. Contrary to Ms. 
Tanner's argument, there is no evidence in the record that Ms. 
Tanner will not receive continuing large distributions from 
Tanner, Inc. in the future. (R. 83, 84 & 86). The evidence 
clearly establishes that Tanner, Inc. has a large number of 
valuable assets including: 3,500 acres in the high New Mexico 
desert, 150 head of beef cattle, $125,000 in vehicles and 
equipment, $305,000 contract balance, $4,700 checking account and 
$24,700 money market account. (R. 84-86). The assets in Tanner, 
Inc. have considerable value of which Ms. Tanner owns an eight 
percent (8%) interest. If Ms. Tanner does not receive stock 
distributions from Tanner, Inc. in the future, she could 
liquidate its assets. Ms. Tanner's comment that she was informed 
by her father that she will not be receiving any more large 
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disbursements is hearsay which was objected to and sustained on 
two occasions in the record. (R. 51, 98). Ms. Tanner's argument 
based upon purported facts which were objected to and sustained 
by the trial court violative of trial and appellate procedure. 
Thus, the trial court formulated its alimony award based 
upon the Jones factors. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ASSESSING 
MS. TANNER INCOME FROM EARNINGS RECEIVED FROM HER INTEREST 
IN HER FAMILY'S CORPORATION. 
The Utah courts have adopted the general rule that inherited 
property is separate property from the marital estate and not 
subject to distribution upon divorce. Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 
1166, 1168 (Utah App. 1990); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen 760 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Ms. Tanner appears to contend that 
any distributions that she receives from Tanner, Inc., is "pre-
inheritance or pre-marital property," rather than income or 
imputed income. However, it is clearly within the trial court's 
discretion to attribute the distributions Ms. Tanner receives 
from Tanner, Inc. as gross or imputed "income." 
Clearly, the distributions from Tanner, Inc. are "income." 
Ms. Tanner explicitly testified that the disbursements from 
Tanner, Inc. were "income." (R. 90). Ms. Tanner further 
testified that Mr. Swensen prepared the parties' tax returns. 
29 
(R. 86). Mr. Swensen is a Certified Public Accountant. He 
testified that he prepared all the tax returns for the family and 
that he did so pursuant to generally accepted accounting 
principles. (R. 103). Mr. Swensen further testified that each 
year Ms. Tanner would receive a Form K-1 allocating the taxable 
distributions from Tanner, Inc. (R. 104-105). Form K-1 
allocates items of income gain, loss, and deduction to the 
individual shareholders in proportion to their stock ownership. 
(R. 105). Ms. Tanner and the other shareholders of Tanner, Inc. 
would receive a Form K-1 representing taxable income which should 
be included in their respective individual income taxes. Id. 
Corporate income was taxable to Ms. Tanner and Mr. Swensen was 
responsible for including Ms. Tanner's Form K-ls as income on the 
parties' joint tax returns. The Form K-ls evidence distributions 
received by Ms. Tanner for income tax purposes and are clear 
evidence of income. Pursuant to the Form K-ls received into 
evidence, the actual distributions received by Ms. Tanner from 
Tanner, Inc. amounting to $2,000 for 1989, $2,000 for 1990, 
$4,000 for 1991, $8,000 for 1992, and $8,000 for 1993 ($24,000) 
were income from the asset and not a distribution of an asset. 
(R. 131). 
Section 78-45-7.5(1)(b) also provides for determination of 
imputed and gross income. That provision clearly states that 
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gross income includes "dividends." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.5(1)(b) (1953, as amended). The distributions that Ms. Tanner 
received were distributions declared by Tanner, Inc. 
Arguendo, even if the actual distributions were considered 
"pre-inheritance or premarital property" as suggested by Ms. 
Tanner, the evidence establishes that those distributions were 
commingled and used by the parties to pay family taxes, 
obligations, and other family expenditures. (R. 49). Thus, in 
any case the prior distributions lost their identity and became 
marital property. Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 263 (citing Burt, 799 
P.2d at 1168) . 
In accordance with Utah law, the trial court properly held 
that Ms. Tanner's eight percent (8%) interest in her family 
corporation was pre-inheritance/premarital property. However, 
the evidence clearly established that the distributions which Ms. 
Tanner received during the marriage were income and not a 
distribution of assets. (R. 84). Thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by imputing income to Ms. Tanner from the 
earnings actually received from her interest in Tanner, Inc. 
since the basis for her income was the sale of a trading post on 
a ten year contract which has a balance payable of $305,000. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING THE 
ALIMONY AWARD TO TWO YEARS. 
Ms. Tanner also contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in limiting her alimony award to two years. The trial 
court's award of alimony is rehabilitative in nature. The trial 
court found that Ms. Tanner is presently enrolled at the 
University of Utah in a graduate program which she will complete 
within two years with a Masters Degree in Expressive Therapy. 
(Tr. 5, R. 23-24). The trial court specifically found that upon 
graduation Ms. Tanner expects to be able to earn $20,000 per 
year, which together with the child support which she receives 
from Mr. Swensen will be more than adequate to meet her needs as 
established by her testimony. (Tr. 5). Finding that Ms. Tanner 
will complete her graduate schooling within two years, the trial 
court awarded alimony of $700 per month for those two years. 
(Tr. 5). The trial court's award is generous based upon the fact 
that Ms. Tanner could finish as early as one year. The trial 
court appropriately found that Ms. Tanner will not have 
sufficient income for the first two years following the divorce. 
However, after two years Ms. Tanner will be able to produce 
sufficient income. 
Unlike the facts in the Jones case, Ms. Tanner has a number 
of marketable skills as evidenced by her secretarial degree, her 
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art degree, and she has worked intermittently throughout the 
marriage. Ms. Tanner worked full time in clerical positions up 
through 1982, when Mr. Swensen finished law school. (R. 59). 
Since she received her art degree in 1989, Ms. Tanner has 
regularly taught summer art classes. (R. 87). Further 
distinguishable from Jones, Ms. Tanner has recently spent a 
substantial amount of time obtaining higher education for herself 
while being supported by Mr. Swensen. Within the last five 
years, she has enhanced her marketability by completing a four-
year art degree. Ms. Tanner is presently completing a Master's 
degree from which she expects to benefit from an income of 
$20,000 per year. 
"The purposes of an alimony award include enabling the 
receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage," and preventing him or her 
from becoming a public charge. Munns, 790 P.2d at 118; Noble v. 
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988). The trial court 
carefully considered Ms. Tanner's ability to maintain, as nearly 
as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
Moreover, the trial judge took measures to ensure that Ms. Tanner 
will not become a public charge. 
Based upon the trial court's findings, Ms. Tanner has 
received over $92,000 worth of marital property in assets, has an 
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eight percent (8%) interest in Tanner Family Corporation, will 
receive $700.00 a month for over 24 months ($16,800.00) in 
temporary support, and upon completion of her Master's degree, 
she thereafter expects to earn $20,000 a year. (Tr. 5-6). 
Notably, Ms. Tanner owns an eight percent (8%) interest in the 
ten year contract for the sale of Tanner, Inc.'s trading post 
which has a contract balance of $305,000. Ms. Tanner is not, and 
will not become a public charge. See Munns, 790 P.2d at 118. 
The evidence at trial further established that Ms. Tanner 
has disposable income as evidenced by her testimony of monthly 
payoff of her credit card obligations, computer purchase, 
enrollment in self-esteem training courses, and charitable 
contributions. (R. 60, 63, 88-89, 99). 
Contrary to Ms. Tanner's argument, terminating Ms. Tanner's 
alimony in two years is not "speculative and pure conjecture." 
The Judge's findings were based upon Ms. Tanner's testimony 
regarding her expectations and opinions of obtaining employment 
that would enable her to support herself. By Ms. Tanner's own 
calculations she will complete her Master's degree and her thesis 
within two years. (R. 94). Further, Ms. Tanner testified that 
if she decides not to write a thesis, she may be finished within 
a year. (R. 95). The trial court gave Ms. Tanner the benefit of 
any doubt that she will not complete a thesis and finish school 
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early in making its rehabilitative alimony award. Thus, there 
was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's consideration of 
the evidence and limiting of the alimony award to two years. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DECLINING TO 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO EITHER PARTY. 
The trial court has discretion to either award or deny 
attorney's fees. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah 
App. 1988). This Court has held that "[t]he award must be based 
on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Willey v. Willey, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
App. 1991)). 
First, Ms. Tanner has not demonstrated financial need for 
assistance in discharging her attorney's fees as required by 
Willey and Bell. Id. Based upon the evidence, the trial court 
specifically found that Ms. Tanner would not need assistance in 
the payment of her attorney's fees. (Tr. 6). The findings of the 
trial court are supported by the fact that Ms. Tanner has no 
outstanding debt and pays off her credit cards monthly. (R. 60). 
Additionally, Ms. Tanner has sufficient disposable income 
evidenced by a recent computer purchase ($1,500), expenditures 
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for self-esteem training courses ($2,800), and charitable 
contributions ($1,600). (R. 60, 63, 88-89, 99). 
As further evidence of Ms. Tanner's disposable income, she 
has retained three different attorneys to represent her in this 
matter. (R. 35). The first two attorneys were dismissed because 
Ms. Tanner believed, as a lay person, they were unqualified to 
handle her matter. (R. 35-36). Prior to representation by Ms. 
McConkie, Ms. Tanner paid her former attorneys fees in the amount 
of approximately $5,000. (R. 35). Thus, the record demonstrates 
that Ms. Tanner has been able to pay her attorneys fees in the 
past. 
The trial court also found that Ms. Tanner was not in need 
of assistance to pay her attorney's fees based upon the property 
distribution and other sources of income available to her. (Tr. 
5-6). Ms. Tanner received $92,000 of the marital estate and a 
sizable interest in the Tanner, Inc. Id. Therefore, the trial 
court was "persuaded that [Ms. Tanner] would not need assistance 
in the payment of her attorney's fees." (Tr. 6). 
Second, according to Bell and Willey, the receiving spouse 
must demonstrate the ability of the other spouse to pay their 
attorney's fees. Willey, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43; Bell, 810 
P.2d at 493. In this case, the trial court found that neither 
party demonstrated the ability of the other spouse to pay 
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attorney's fees. Specifically the trial court evaluated Mr. 
Swensen's disposable earnings of $3,671 per month against his 
reasonable monthly expenses of $2,108, child support obligation 
of $1,286, and alimony obligation of $700, and made a finding 
that Mr. Swensen did not have an ability to pay any more to Ms. 
Tanner in the way of assistance or support. (Tr. 4). 
Third, there is no evidence of need or the reasonableness of 
the requested fees. Bell, 810 P.2d at 493; Willey, 227 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 43. Attorney's fees should be denied where there is no 
evidentiary basis for attorney's fees. Delatore v. Delatore, 680 
P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980); 
Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969) (holding that an 
attorney's fee may not be awarded "where there is nothing in the 
record to sustain the award, either by way of evidence or by 
stipulation of the parties as to how the court may fix it"). 
In the present case, the trial court expressly found that 
there was no evidentiary basis upon which to make an order for 
attorney's fees to be paid by either Mr. Swensen or Ms. Tanner. 
(Tr. 6). Moreover, there was no testimony from Ms. Tanner 
regarding her need for attorney's fees or inability to pay 
attorney's fees in direct examination or otherwise. (R. 192). 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
regarding attorney's fees. 
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POINT VII 
THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL JUDGE 
DISALLOWING THE PARTIES FROM PRESENTING CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
The trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying both 
parties the opportunity to present closing argument. The present 
case is easily distinguishable from the Bunnell v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah case cited by Appellant. 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
1987). In the Bunnell case, the Utah Supreme Court held that due 
process was denied where several unacceptable factors 
demonstrated that the administrative law judge's conduct was not 
impartial. Id. at 1333-34. Mere dicta in the Bunnell case 
suggests that the judge "was also intolerant of counsel's 
argument on behalf of plaintiff . . . [and] refused to listen to 
closing argument." The administrative law judge then "told the 
plaintiff's counsel to save the argument for rehearing, 
indicating that he had already decided to hold against plaintiff 
without even examining the medical records." Id. Unlike the 
Bunnell case, Ms. Tanner was not prejudiced, because neither 
party was allowed to present closing argument. The trial judge 
made no indication that he had already made a decision against 
Ms. Tanner. 
The issues in this case were largely factual. The parties 
were not inhibited in their ability to present the facts or 
evidence. Ms. Tanner could have filed a trial brief, but chose 
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not to. The trial judge merely disallowed the parties from 
arguing the law in closing arguments. The present divorce matter 
did not involve issues of complex law requiring a presentation 
and explanation of case law. The trial judge is very familiar 
with the law and legal standards in divorce proceedings. No such 
argument was needed for the trial court to come to an equitable 
resolution of the issues. Divorce matters are heard before a 
trial judge rather than a jury where argument and instruction may 
be required. Neither party presented closing argument. It was 
within the trial judge's discretion to deny both parties' 
presentation of closing arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Tanner contends that the court did not follow the Jones 
factors in making its findings relating to alimony, property 
division, and attorney's fees. However, in analysis, it is 
evident that the trial court's findings support those very 
factors. The trial court clearly and equitably considered each 
of the Jones factors in making its findings relating to property 
distribution, support, and attorney's fees. 
Ms. Tanner distorts the facts and ignores the trial court's 
findings Ms. Tanner received over one-half of the marital assets 
value at $92,000, she received an eight percent (8%) interest in 
Tanner, Inc. and its income ($36,758 plus 8% interest in 3,600 
39 
acres and 150 head of cattle), continues to receive $700.00 a 
month for over 24 months ($16,800.00) in temporary support. Upon 
completion of her Master's degree, she will have marketable 
skills from which she expects to earn at least $20,000 a year. 
In reality, Ms. Tanner received more tangible assets than did Mr. 
Swensen. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this / O day of October, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L (Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq. 
5RINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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J> 
< & 
Asset Sheet For Tanner Inc. 
Approximately: 
1. 3,500 acres in high New Mexico desert (value unknown 
without appraisal). 
2. 150 heads of beef cattle (value presently unknown). 
3. $125,000.00—vehicles and equipment. 
4. $305,000.00—contract balance. 
5. $4,786.00—checking account balance. 
6. $24,700.00—Money Market Account. 
